Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) by Steffey, Matthew S.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 6
Winter 1986
Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143 (Md.
1985)
Matthew S. Steffey
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Torts Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew S. Steffey, Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985), 14 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 149 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol14/iss1/6
Torts-STRICT LIABILITY-MANUFACTURERS' OR MARKETERS'
LIABILITY FOR THE CRIMINAL USE OF SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIALS: A
NEW COMMON LAW APPROACH-Kelley v. R.G. Industries, 497 A.2d
1143 (Md. 1985)
Until October 3, 1985, no jurisdiction recognized a cause of ac-
tion against a handgun manufacturer or marketer for injuries occa-
sioned by the criminal use of a handgun. On that date, in Kelley v.
R.G. Industries,' the Maryland Court of Appeals unanimously rec-
ognized a new, limited area of strict liability for those who manu-
facture or market "Saturday Night Specials." The decision stands
as a victory for anti-handgun advocates who have been frustrated
by the inability to achieve their goals through legislative channels.2
Soon Florida courts will be asked to decide if such an action is
cognizable. Recently, a suit was filed in the Eleventh Judicial Cir-
cuit Court in Dade County seeking damages against the manufac-
turer and marketer of a Saturday Night Special used to kill the
plaintiff's husband.3 Prescher v. Rohm Gesellschaft' is predicated
on the theory that the manufacturer and marketer knew or should
have known at the time the gun was made and sold that it was not
suitable for legitimate purposes and was instead more likely to be
used for criminal purposes. 5
The purpose of this Note is to examine the Kelley court's treat-
ment of traditional strict liability theories, to discuss the court's
creation of a new common law cause of action against a manufac-
turer or marketer of a cheap handgun used to shoot an innocent
victim during a criminal offense, to evaluate the court's decision,
and to offer a comparative analysis of strict liability law and hand-
gun policy in Florida.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF Kelley
Olen J. Kelley's cause arose during an armed robbery of the gro-
cery store where he worked.' Kelley's assailant shot him in the
chest with a Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S designed and
1. 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
2. See Note, Legal Limits of a Handgun Manufacturer's Liability for the Criminal Acts
of Third Persons, 49 Mo. L. REV. 830, n.3 (1984) (indicating articles in numerous periodicals
discussing litigation brought against handgun manufacturers).
3. Plaintiff's Complaint at 1, 2, Prescher v. Rohm Gesellschaft, No. 85-43414CA05 (Fla.
lth Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 17, 1985).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2. The principal defendants are Rohm Gesellschaft and R.G. Industries, who
were also defendants in Kelley.
6. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1144.
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marketed by the West German corporation Rohm Gesellschaft.7
Kelley and his wife filed suit in the Montgomery County Circuit
Court against Rohm Gesellschaft and R.G. Industries, a Miami,
Florida, subsidiary which assembled and initially sold the re-
volver.' The case was subsequently removed to the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland.9
The Kelleys' declaration offered four theories of recovery, two of
which were at issue on appeal: 10 that Rohm should be strictly lia-
ble for Kelley's injury because the handgun was abnormally dan-
gerous, and that the handgun was unreasonably dangerous due to a
defect in its design, distribution, marketing, and promotion."
Rohm moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted," contending that the handgun per-
formed properly, and that the corporation could not be held re-
sponsible for the criminal and tortious conduct of an assailant.'"
Finding no dispositive precedent on the strict liability issues, the
district court certified two questions to the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals. Because of issues raised at oral argument, the district court
substituted a series of questions which the court of appeals re-
phrased as follows:
1) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a handgun, in general, lia-
ble under any strict liability theory to a person injured as a result
of the criminal use of its product?
2) Is the manufacturer or marketer of a particular category of
small, cheap handguns, sometimes referred to as "Saturday Night
Specials," and regularly used in criminal activity, strictly liable to
a person injured by such handgun during the course of a crime?
3) Does the Rohm Revolver Handgun Model RG38S, serial num-
ber 0152662, fall within the category referred to in question 2?"'
7. Id. at 1144-45. A Saturday Night Special may be defined as a handgun that costs $50
or less, which is of .32 caliber or less, and which has a barrel length shorter than three
inches. Id. at 1153 n.9. However, gun size and barrel length alone are not determinative;
small, high-quality, short-barreled handguns designed for legitimate uses are not Saturday
Night Specials. Id. at 1160. Because of the variety of weapons available, rarely should a
handgun be deemed a Saturday Night Special as a matter of law. Id.
8. Id. at 1145. R.G. Industries was later dismissed from the case by stipulation of the
parties after it filed an answer and motion for summary judgment on the ground that it had
not marketed the weapon. Id.
9. Id.
10. The two other theories were negligence and loss of consortium. Id.
11. Id.
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
13. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1145.
14. Id. at 1146.
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II. TRADITIONAL THEORIES
The first, broad question addressed by the court was whether a
handgun manufacturer or marketer is strictly liable under any rec-
ognized theory to persons injured as a result of a gun's criminal
use. In light of this question the court considered Kelley's two pro-
posed strict liability theories: (1) that manufacturing or marketing
a handgun is an abnormally dangerous activity under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts sections 519 and 520,'" and (2) that hand-
guns are abnormally dangerous products under the Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 402A.' e Indeed, most plaintiffs and com-
mentators who have argued for recovery against handgun manufac-
turers have done so under these two theories. 17
A. The Abnormally Dangerous Activity Doctrine
The abnormally dangerous activity doctrine recognizes liability
for injuries resulting from such an activity regardless of the degree
of care exercised to avoid harm.1 8 The Restatement lists six factors
which are used to determine whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous. 9 The court, however, rejected the imposition of liabil-
ity against a handgun manufacturer under this doctrine despite
the fact that handgun use may indeed satisfy each of these fac-
tors.20 This conclusion was based on the fact that Maryland courts
have applied the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine only to
situations where the tortfeasor is an owner or occupier of land.2 1 If
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1976).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
17. See infra notes 22 & 33, 34 and accompanying text.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment d (1976).
19. These six factors are:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels
of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976).
20. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147.
21. Id. (citing Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969) (gas station operator may
be liable for damage to adjacent landowner's well); Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pac. Co., 4 A.2d
757 (Md. 1939) (a defendant must own or control land to be liable for related injury); Kirby
v. Hylton, 443 A.2d 640 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (affirming the doctrine of strict liability
espoused in Toy and Yommer).
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manufacturing or marketing Saturday Night Specials were abnor-
mally dangerous relative to the locality where the activity was car-
ried on, liability under section 519 might arise. The court reasoned,
however, that Saturday Night Specials pose a threat independent
of the use of land and thus liability under this theory was unwar-
ranted. All other courts which have decided this issue have also
concluded that this doctrine does not support the imposition of lia-
bility against a handgun manufacturer.22
B. Products Liability Under Restatement 402A
The second theory addressed by the court was that a handgun is
an unreasonably dangerous product which should trigger a strict
products liability analysis under Restatement section 402A. 23 Ma-
ryland had adopted section 402A in Phipps v. General Motors
Corp.,2 and the Kelley court indicated that to recover under this
22. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1266-67 (5th Cir. 1985) (abnormally dan-
gerous activity must be connected with land or other immovables, and the injury must re-
sult from the activity itself); Martin v. Harrington Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1203
(7th Cir. 1984) (use of a handgun, not its manufacture, makes it abnormally dangerous);
Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1297 (IIl. App. Ct. 1985) (man-
ufacture or sale of handguns not an abnormally dangerous activity, rather use of handgun
poses the danger); Burkett v. Freedom Arms, Inc., 704 P.2d 118, 121 (Or. 1985) (manufac-
ture, design, sale, or marketing of handguns not abnormally dangerous activities because the
danger must be inherent in the activity, not in the use of the activity's product). For addi-
tional argument opposing strict liability against gun manufacturers under the abnormally
dangerous activity doctrine, see also Note, supra note 2, at 837-40. But see Disarming the
Handgun Problem By Directly Suing Arms Makers, NAT'L L.J., June 8, 1981, at 30, col. 2.
See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 78 (4th ed. 1971).
23. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1147. This section provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
24. 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976). The Phipps court concluded that a plaintiff must establish:
(1) the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the possession
or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or con-
sumer, (3) that the defect was a cause of the injuries, and (4) that the product was
expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its
condition.
Id. at 958.
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theory a plaintiff must show that the product was defective when
sold so as to render it unreasonably dangerous.2 When determin-
ing if a manufacturing or design defect exists, Maryland courts fol-
low the consumer expectation test, meaning the product must be
"dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary consumer who purchases it.''26 Using this analysis,
the court held that strict products liability could not be imposed
against a handgun manufacturer because firing a bullet with
deadly force is precisely what a consumer would expect a handgun
to be able to do. As the court stated:
Kelley confuses a product's normal function, which may very well
be dangerous, with a defect in a product's design or construction.
For example, an automobile is a dangerous product, if used to run
down pedestrians .... But that same automobile might also be
defective in its design or construction, e.g., if the gasoline tank
were placed in such position that it could easily explode in a rear-
end collision.. . . Similarly, a handgun is dangerous because its
normal function is to propel bullets with deadly force. That alone
is not sufficient for its manufacturer to incur liability under §
402A. For the handgun to be defective, there would have to be a
problem in its manufacture or design, such as a weak or improp-
erly placed part, that would cause it to fire unexpectedly or other-
wise malfunction.2 8
The court also addressed the applicability of the risk/utility test
for design defect cases as articulated in Barker v. Lull Engineer-
ing.29 In Barker the California Supreme Court announced a two-
part definition of design defect which included a balancing of the
risks and utilities inherent in a product's particular design." How-
ever, the Maryland court found the risk/utility test inapplicable in
Kelley on the ground that the standard applies only when a prod-
25. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1148.
26. Phipps, 363 A.2d at 959 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOaTS § 402A comment
i (1964)).
27. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1148.
28. Id. (emphasis in original).
29. 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). Although Maryland has never expressly applied the risk/
utility test, authority exists to support use of the standard in that jurisdiction. See Phipps,
363 A.2d at 959; Sheehan v. Anthony Pools, 440 A.2d 1085, 1089 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982),
aff'd, 455 A.2d 434 (Md. 1983).
30. Barker, 573 P.2d at 455-58. Specifically, the two-part balancing test is whether "in
light of the relevant factors . . .the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of
danger inherent in such design." Id. at 458.
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uct malfunctions,31 and the handgun in question did not.
The court thus concluded that regardless of the test used,
whether consumer expectation or risk/utility, section 402A liability
was inappropriate because a product that performs as intended
and expected simply cannot be characterized as defective.3 2 Again,
this conclusion is consistent with the decisions of all other courts
presented with product liability claims,3 3 and with the views of nu-
merous commentators.3 4
III. A NEW COMMON LAW CAUSE OF ACTION
Although the Maryland court in Kelley held that existing strict
liability law could not support the cause of action in the case
before it, it went further than all other courts that have examined
the handgun liability issue. It did not simply consider the conven-
tional theories of recovery. Instead, the court boldly created an en-
tirely new but limited common law cause of action against the
31. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1149.
32. Id.
33. See Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1269-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (properly func-
tioning handguns lack the requisite defect, thus do not give rise to liability under either the
risk/utility or consumer expectation tests); Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743
F.2d 1200, 1201 (7th Cir. 1984) (unreasonably dangerous theory inapplicable without a
showing of defect); Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-99
(Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (a handgun that works as expected fails both the consumer expectation
and risk/utility tests absent a showing of defect); Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp.
1206, 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (liability under § 402A using the risk/utility balancing test
inappropriate without showing something wrong with the product). However, one court,
finding that the absence of a legislative ban on handguns indicated they were not unreason-
ably dangerous, specifically reserved the question of whether Saturday Night Specials might
be subject to that products liability doctrine. Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107,
110-11 (D. Mass. 1983).
34. See Santarelli & Calio, Turning the Gun on Tort Law: Aiming at Courts to Take
Products Liability to the Limit, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471 (1983); Note, Handguns and Prod-
ucts Liability, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1912 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Handguns]; cf. Note,
Manufacturers' Strict Liability for Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun, 24 Wm. & MARY
L. REV. 467 (1983) (under Barker, anti-handgun plaintiff must surmount a number of obsta-
cles, yet this is not impossible) [hereinafter cited as Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability].
But see Fisher, Are Handgun Manufacturers Strictly Liable in Tort?, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 16
(1981) (arguing for strict liability under the Barker test); Turley, Manufacturers' and Sup-
pliers' Liability to Handgun Victims, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 41 (1982) (advocating strict liability
under a risk/utility analysis); Turley & Harrison, Strict Tort Liability of Handgun Suppli-
ers, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 285 (1983) (same); Note, Manufacturers' Liability to Victims of
Handgun Crime: A Common-Law Approach, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1983) (Saturday
Night Specials are a defective product line and therefore ought to trigger liability as an
unreasonably dangerous product under a risk/benefit analysis.) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Manufacturers' Liability to Victims]. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
comment g (1964) (discussing the defect requirement).
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manufacturer or marketer of a Saturday Night Special for injuries
resulting from its criminal use.
The court found a basis for expanding the common law in the
principle that:
the common law is not static; its life and heart is its dyna-
mism-its ability to keep pace with the world while constantly
searching for just and fair solutions to pressing societal problems.
The common law is, therefore, subject to judicial modification in
light of modern circumstances or increased knowledge."5
The court noted that this idea of judicial activism must be bal-
anced against the principle that the common law should not be at
odds with public policy." The court thus sought to determine if
contemporary circumstances and knowledge would support a com-
mon law cause of action against Saturday Night Special manufac-
turers or marketers without running afoul of the handgun policies
articulated by the state legislature.
To ascertain the state's policy, the court looked to Maryland's
comprehensive statutory scheme which regulates the wearing, car-
rying, and transporting of handguns.37 The statute begins with a
broad policy statement to the effect that extensive regulation of
handguns is necessary to curb an alarming rise in the number of
injuries resulting from their criminal use.38 The Maryland General
Assembly made it unlawful to carry, wear, or transport handguns,
whether openly visible or concealed.3 9 Exceptions were carved out
for federal and state law enforcement personnel, persons engaged
in hunting and target practice, use in the protection of a home or
business if confined to the property owned or leased by the user,4
and persons demonstrating "good and substantial reason" to be is-
sued a permit by the superintendent of the Maryland State Po-
lice.' The court concluded that the statutory provisions allowing
35. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1150-51 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at 1151.
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 36B-G (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1985).
38. Id. § 36B(a)(i)-(iv).
39. Id. § 36B(b).
40. Id. § 36B(b)-(c).
41. Id. § 36E(a)(6). Persons granted permits under § 36E are included in the § 36B(c)
exceptions. An applicant for a permit must be 18 years of age or older, id. § 36E(a)(1); may
not have been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor which carries a sentence of more than
one year, id. § 36E(a)(2); may not, within the past 10 years, have been committed to a
juvenile correction center or similar facility after being adjudged a juvenile delinquent, id. §
36E(a)(3); may not have been convicted of an offense involving a controlled substance or
19861
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persons to possess and carry handguns in certain circumstances
demonstrate that handgun use is not per se inconsistent with Ma-
ryland public policy.'2 On the contrary, the court stated that im-
posing liability on manufacturers or marketers of handguns gener-
ally would be antithetical to legislative policy. 43 Yet the court
deemed one particular type of handgun unsuited for any of the
legitimate purposes recognized by the legislature. It thus created
an exception to the general rule against manufacturer or marketer
liability for the category of guns called Saturday Night Specials."44
These weapons possess distinct characteristics tailor-made for
criminal use: they are light-weight, short-barreled, inexpensive,
and easily concealed. Moreover, because they are poorly made, of
low quality, and are generally inaccurate and unreliable, they are
virtually useless for law enforcement, sport, or personal protec-
tion.'5 Further, the guns are difficult to trace and identify because
they are so easily altered.' 6 For these reasons, the Maryland court
found Saturday Night Specials warrant and are amenable to dis-
tinct legal treatment. The court looked to the Gun Control Act of
196847 for a declaration of federal policy on the subject and found
there additional support for its novel theory. Federal law prohibits
the importation of firearms but provides exceptions for sporting,
military, and other purposes. 8 Because the statute allows the im-
currently be an addict or habitual drug user or alcoholic, id. § 36E(a)(4); must not, after an
investigation, exhibit a propensity for violence or instability, id. § 36E(a)(5); and should
have "good and substantial reason" to carry a handgun, such as the weapon is necessary as a
reasonable precaution against apprehended danger, id. § 36E(a)(6).
42. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1152-53.
43. Id. at 1153.
44. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153. See supra note 7.
45. Id. at 1153-54 & n.10. See also Cook, The "Saturday Night Special:" An Assessment
of Alternative Definitions From a Policy Perspective, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1735
(1981) (data indicating Saturday Night Specials have little value to noncriminals); Note,
Manufacturers' Liability to Victims, supra note 34, at 791 n.124 (statistics showing most
crimes involving handguns are committed with Saturday Night Specials). Saturday Night
Specials are made of such poor quality materials that prolonged use for target shooting is
impractical, the short barrel length precludes use for hunting, and the combination of the
short barrel length and small caliber precludes the velocity and bullet size necessary for
effective self-defense. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153 n.9, (noting BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO
AND FIREARMS, PROJECT IDENTIFICATION: A STUDY OF HANDGUNS USED IN CRIME 6, 7 (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Dep't of Treas. 1974)); Hearings on S.2507 Before the Subcomm. to Investi-
gate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 109-
10 (1971) (statement of Geoffrey Alprin) [hereinafter cited as Handgun Control Hearings].
46. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153 n.9.
47. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921-28 (1982)).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 925(a)-(d) prohibits the importation of any firearm not suited for, or
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portation of handguns for specific purposes, the court reasoned
that Congress recognized a species of firearms that serves no legiti-
mate purpose, namely Saturday Night Specials.4 As evidence of
this congressional belief, the court looked to the legislative history
of the Act, noting one senator's comments:
In the course of these hearings, special attention was focused on
Saturday night specials because these handguns present a partic-
ular problem for law enforcement and public safety by reason of
their cheapness, low quality, ease of concealment, and ready
availability. Having no legitimate sporting purpose, these weap-
ons, also known as "bellyguns" and "manstoppers," are the pre-
dominant firearm used in crime."
Thus, the court was able to conclude that both federal and state
policy, as expressed by legislative bodies, support the view that
Saturday Night Specials "have little or no legitimate purpose in
today's society."51 This conclusion enabled the court to find that
current circumstances warrant the imposition of strict liability
against manufacturers or marketers of Saturday Night Specials
and that such liability is consistent with public policy.2
The court had no difficulty in imputing knowledge to a manufac-
turer or marketer making or selling a product used principally in
criminal activity.5 3 By stating that such criminal use is foreseeable,
the traditional tort barrier of causation was overcome with one
simple judicial finding.5 4
The Maryland Court of Appeals thus gave birth to an unprece-
readily adaptable to, a sport, law enforcement, research, or other legitimate purpose. For the
court's analysis of the federal Gun Control Act, see Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1154-57.
49. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1156.
50. 118 CONG. REc. 27,030 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh, subcommittee chairman). See
also Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1156-57 for additional legislative history. Further, the court took
notice that no leading manufacturer of such guns would testify before the Senate Commit-
tee on the Judiciary when subcommittee hearings were held on Saturday Night Specials. Id.
at 1158 n.18. The inference arising from this fact is that responsible firearm manufacturers
agree about the paucity of legitimate uses for Saturday Night Specials.
51. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1158. The court pointed out that during the Senate hearings on
the Gun Control Act, Maxwell Rich, then Executive Vice President of the National Rifle
Association, testified that advertisements for Saturday Night Specials had never to his
knowledge been accepted in the group's publication, The American Rifleman, because these
weapons are poorly made, have no sporting uses, and "do not represent value received to
any purchaser." Id. at 1154 n.10 (citing Handgun Control Hearings, supra note 45, at 315).
52. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159.
53. Id. at 1158-59.
54. For a discussion of the causation problems, see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying
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dented cause of action: manufacturers of Saturday Night Specials
as well as all other sellers in the marketing chain are strictly liable
in tort for injuries which result from the weapons' criminal use.6
To succeed in such an action, the plaintiff must establish that the
handgun used was a Saturday Night Special, 0 the shooting was a
criminal act,57 and the plaintiff was not a participant in the crimi-
nal act.6 8 The trier of fact must determine whether a particular
handgun is a Saturday Night Special by considering a number of
factors; such as, gun-barrel length, concealability, cost, quality of
materials, quality of manufacture, accuracy, and reliability;
whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has banned
its importation; applicable industry standards; and the views of
law enforcement personnel, legislators, and the public.59 Neither
the doctrine of contributory negligence nor the doctrine of assump-
tion of the risk will operate as a defense.60 If found liable, the man-
ufacturer or marketer must pay all resulting damages."' This new
cause of action was available to Kelley and to all others injured
after the date of the decision unless the defendant could prove the
gun was marketed before Kelley was decided. 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE MARYLAND DECISION
The most noteworthy aspect of the Kelley decision is its frank-
ness. Instead of attempting to force this cause of action within ex-
isting strict liability theories, the court recognized the uniqueness
of the claim and accordingly created a new common law theory of
recovery.
The most troublesome aspect of the decision is its cursory treat-
ment of the causation issues. Difficult questions of policy are in-
volved in holding a party liable for the criminal acts of a third
party. Tort liability arises only when an actor's conduct is both a
cause in fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 3
55. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1159.
56. Id. See supra note 7.
57. Id. at 1160. The shooting can be the criminal act or may occur in the course of
another crime.
58. Id. at 1160 & n.20. Potential plaintiffs include intended victims, innocent bystanders,
law enforcement personnel, or persons who intervene to prevent the crime, assist victims, or
apprehend the perpetrator.
59. Id. at 1159-60.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1162.
63. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, §§ 41, 42.
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Although these two concepts are difficult to distinguish, cause in
fact, or "but for" causation, is established when the tortfeasor's act
was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.6 4 One does not
escape liability simply because one's conduct is not the sole factual
cause of the injury.6 Proximate, or legal, causation limits liability
to instances when the conduct foreseeably causes the plaintiff's in-
jury.66 The specific chain of events which brings about the harm
need not be anticipated, but the general type or character of harm
must be foreseeable.6 7 Although an intervening act is often said to
be an unforeseeable occurrence that breaks the causal link between
the tortfeasor's conduct and the harm, such an intervening event is
foreseeable if it is a significant part of the risk attributable to the
tortfeasor's activity.68 Thus, one is not insulated from liability if a
third party's actions-even if criminal-are a likely hazard.69 The
Kelley court found volumes of evidence indicating that it is com-
mon knowledge among persons in the firearms industry that Satur-
day Night Specials are primarily useful for criminal activity.7 0
From a policy standpoint, if a court were to follow Kelley and
create a new common law cause of action grounded in large part on
the known lack of legitimate uses for Saturday Night Specials, it
would be consistent to impute this knowledge to the manufacturer
and marketer and to categorize the criminal use as foreseeable,
thus overcoming the causation barriers. Once a court decides that
public policy favors holding Saturday Night Special manufacturers
and marketers liable because they have introduced into the stream
of commerce a product fit only for criminal use, the court should
64. Id. § 41 at 240-41; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1964).
65. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 41, at 240-41.
66. Id. § 43 at 250.
67. Id. §§ 42, 43.
68. Id. § 44, at 272.
69. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 449 (1964). See Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev.
Corp., 647 P.2d 713, 721-22 (Hawaii 1982) (criminal use of a rifle not foreseeable when the
purchaser exhibited no unusual conduct); Robinson v. Howard Bros., 372 So. 2d 1074, 1076
(Miss. 1979) (criminal use not foreseeable and instead a superseding cause where there was
no notice of a criminal record or propensity for violence). These cases deal with the foresee-
ability of a particular chain of events. See also Santarelli & Calio, supra note 34, at 476-78,
487-91 (criminal acts of a third party not foreseeable thus the manufacturers' actions are
not the proximate cause of handgun injuries); Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability, supra
note 34, at 493-97 (criminal misuse of a handgun not foreseeable). But see Decker v. Gibson
Prod. Co., 679 F.2d 212, 215-16 (11th Cir. 1982) (in some cases, criminal acts by third per-
sons involving firearms are foreseeable); Turley & Harrison, supra note 34, at 293-95 (crimi-
nal use of handguns foreseeable).
70. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
71. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1964).
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have little trouble deciding that the criminal act of a person pull-
ing the gun's trigger is foreseeable and thus does not break the
causal nexus between the manufacturer's or marketer's conduct
and the injury.
The larger question which must be addressed in evaluating the
wisdom of the Kelley decision is who should decide how society
will deal with the problem of handgun violence. The tremendous
social costs, economic loss, human suffering, and personal tragedy
inherent to this issue make the debate heated and emotional.
Many courts and commentators have concluded that the debate
must be settled by a legislative body.72 Only a representative body
is conducive to the robust, wide-open debate that this problem re-
quires.7 3 The legislature is undoubtedly better suited than the
courts to gather the necessary information and hear numerous, va-
ried arguments on the topic. The very fact that legislatures around
the nation have repeatedly heard proposals, held debate, and often
legislated in this general area supports the proposition that the ju-
diciary should not step in and make broad policy when the legisla-
ture has failed to do so.
Kelley is not, however, a case of the judiciary invading legislative
territory to make broad policy. As the court expressly stated, to
hold gun manufacturers or marketers liable for injuries inflicted by
their products as a general rule would indeed be contrary to public
policy as articulated by the legislature and, thus, beyond the
proper exercise of judicial power.74 Rather than enter the general
area of handgun policy which is admittedly reserved for the legisla-
ture, the court evaluated society's interest in a particular category
of handgun-Saturday Night Specials. The court balanced the
value these particular guns have for lawful purposes against the
harm caused by users of Saturday Night Specials. The court found
that because Saturday Night Specials have only minimal utility
but cause substantial injury, the imposition of liability against
manufacturers would promote justice without unduly infringing on
72. See Patterson, 608 F. Supp. at 1216; Mavilia, 574 F. Supp. at 111; see also Santarelli
& Calio, supra note 34, at 505-06; Note, Handguns, supra note 34, at 1924-28; Note, supra
note 2, at 850-52.
73. Santarelli & Calio, supra note 34, at 480, point out that there are legitimate uses for
Saturday Night Specials. "[T]hose segments of society most often victimized by crime-the
poor and the elderly"-often use these same handguns as an affordable means of self-de-
fense. The authors also believe that it is not in the public interest to hold manufacturers
responsible for the criminal acts of an individual as this would "send criminals a. . . signal
• . . that society will in fact subsidize their criminal misdeeds." Id. at 507.
74. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1151.
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the rights of persons to own and use handguns for legitimate
purposes.
What the court did was to decide whether a manufacturer or an
innocent victim ought to bear the loss when the gun is used during
the commission of a crime to inflict injury on a blameless individ-
ual. Few issues are more suitable for judicial determination than
who ought to bear tort losses. Simply because the legislature has
regulated a particular activity does not mean the judiciary is pre-
cluded from deciding where losses should fall when an injury asso-
ciated with that activity occurs.
V. FLORIDA LAW AND HANDGUN POLICY
The Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court will soon be faced with a
wrongful death action based on the abnormally dangerous and de-
fective product doctrines. 75 In Prescher v. Rohm Gesellschaft,7" the
wife of a handgun shooting victim complains that the same manu-
facturer who was found liable in Kelley designed, distributed, and
sold a Saturday Night Special that was "defective and unreasona-
bly dangerous .. .and intended exclusively for criminal use." '77
The traditional theories probably will be unavailing.
A. The Unreasonably Dangerous Activity Doctrine
Courts faced with strict liability claims have concluded that
Florida recognizes a cause of action under the abnormally danger-
ous activity doctrine articulated in Restatement sections 519 to
520.18 A plaintiff arguing for handgun manufacturer liability under
this theory would, nevertheless, face many of the same barriers as
did Kelley. In Florida, like Maryland, each individual found
strictly liable for engaging in an abnormally dangerous activity has
been an owner or occupier of land.79 Florida's abnormally danger-
ous activity doctrine developed from the rule in Rylands v.
75. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Prescher, No. 85-43414CA05 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. filed Oct.
17, 1985). The two-count complaint also alleged the defendants were negligent in the design,
manufacture, and distribution of the .22 caliber Saturday Night Special used to kill the
plaintiff's husband. Id. at 2.
76. No. 85-43414CA05 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. filed Oct. 17, 1985).
77. Id. at 3.
78. The leading case is Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). See
also Great Lakes Dredging & Dock Co. v. Sea Gull Operating Corp., 460 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1984); Bunyak v. Clyde J. Yancey & Sons Dairy, Inc., 438 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2d DCA
1983), petition for review denied, 447 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1984); Hutchinson v. Capeletti Bros.,
397 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
79. See cases cited supra note 78.
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Fletcher," which is limited in England to "those land uses deemed
nonnatural." 1 When Florida courts adopted the six-part Restate-
ment test to determine whether an activity is abnormally danger-
ous, the test was similarly restricted to unnatural uses of land
which pose an excessive risk of harm relative to the locality where
the activity occurs.82
B. The Products Liability Doctrine
Products liability theories in Florida seem equally inhospitable
to a claim of handgun manufacturer liability. Florida adopted Re-
statement section 402A in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.83 There,
the Florida Supreme Court stated that strict products liability
should be imposed against manufacturers only when a plaintiff es-
tablishes the manufacturer's relationship to the product, the prod-
uct's defective and unreasonably dangerous condition, and that
this condition proximately caused the injury or damage.84 Under
West, Florida courts have usually applied the consumer expecta-
tion test to determine the existence of a defect8 5 One court articu-
lated the following test for determining either manufacturing or
design defects: "Were the ordinary consumer's expectations frus-
trated by the product's failure to perform under the circumstances
in which it failed?""
There is also strong support for the position that a risk/utility
test is applicable in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court, in Radia-
tion Technology, Inc. v. Ware Construction Co.,87 stated that sec-
tion 402A deals with products which are unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer. What is unreasonably dangerous, the
court continued, may be decided by balancing
the likelihood and gravity of potential injury against the utility of
80. [1868] L.T.R. 22 (n.s.).
81. Bunyak, 438 So. 2d at 893.
82. Id.; see also Cities Serv., 312 So. 2d at 800-03 (both the Rylands doctrine and the
abnormally dangerous activity doctrine deal with non-natural uses of land).
83. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
84. Id. at 86-87.
85. See Zyferman v. Taylor, 444 So. 2d 1088, 1091 (Fla. 4th DCA), petition for review
denied, 453 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1984); Perez v. National Presto Ind., 431 So. 2d 667, 669 (Fla. 3d
DCA), petition for review denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1983); Builders Shoring and Scaffold-
ing Equip. Co., v. Schmidt, 411 So. 2d 1004, 1006-07 (Fla. 5th DCA), petition for review
denied, 419 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1982); Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1144 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981).
86. Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1144-45.
87. 445 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1983).
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the product, the availability of other, safer products to meet the
same need, the obviousness of the danger, public knowledge and
expectation of the danger, the adequacy of instructions and warn-
ings on safe use, and the ability to eliminate or minimize the dan-
ger without seriously impairing the product or making it unduly
expensive."8
Regardless of whether the consumer expectation test or the risk/
utility analysis is used in determining whether a product is unrea-
sonably dangerous, a plaintiff in Florida is unlikely to prevail
against a gun manufacturer under the strict products liability the-
ory of 402A. First, each Florida court that has discussed the 402A
theory of liability has emphasized the need for a showing of a de-
fect to avoid making the manufacturer an insurer.89 Second, the
imposition of liability against a gun manufacturer is not compati-
ble with either the consumer expectation or the risk/utility test as
applied in Florida: the ability of a gun to kill or inflict grave bodily
harm is precisely consistent with consumer expectations. Similarly,
in applying the Radiation Technology test, handgun manufacturer
liability is unwarranted when judged in light of most of the factors
used in the analysis under the 402A theory.90
C. Statutory Policy Basis for a New Cause of Action
Florida has a statutory scheme for handgun regulation similar to
that of Maryland, so a common law cause of action like the one
recognized in Kelley could be supported in Florida. Section 790.25,
Florida Statutes1 contains a declaration of legislative intent to
promote firearm safety and prevent the use of firearms in crimes,
and it makes possession lawful without a permit for, among other
things, law enforcement,9 2 target shooting,9 3 and hunting.9 4 Other
than for those purposes specifically set out in the statute, Florida
88. Id. at 331. See also Cassisi, 396 So. 2d at 1145 (risk/utility analysis preferable in
design defect cases).
89. See cases cited supra note 85.
90. See supra text accompanying note 88. Although the likelihood and gravity of poten-
tial injury from the criminal misuse of a Saturday Night Special outweighs its utility, when
the Radiation Technology test is applied, there are no safer alternative products that would
be able to perform the same functions; the danger is known and obvious; instructions are
unnecessary; and if the dangers inherent in a cheap, poorly made handgun were corrected
its cost would surely rise.
91. FLA. STAT. § 790.25(1) (1985).
92. Id. § 790.25(3)(d).
93. Id. § 790.25(3)(j), (k).
94. Id. § 790.25(3)(h).
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law requires one to obtain a permit in order lawfully to possess a
firearm.9 5 In this fundamental respect, Florida and Maryland law
are comparable."0
Two differences between the Florida and Maryland statutory
gun regulations-each of which could be the basis for arguing that
Florida's policy is significantly weaker and therefore more tolerant
of Saturday Night Specials-are noteworthy. The Florida statute
vests the firearm permitting authority in the county commissions
so long as they apply certain minimum criteria. Maryland law
vests the permitting authority in the superintendent of the state
police. 8 Furthermore, the Florida statute includes a statement of
legislative intent that it be liberally construed to favor the consti-
tutional right to keep and bear arms;99 the Maryland statute does
not. Neither point should alter the analysis. Where the authority
to issue a gun permit is vested is more relevant to concerns about
home rule than about the legitimacy of gun use. In any event, the
two states have remarkably similar minimum criteria for obtaining
a permit.100 The legislative intent to construe the statute to favor
gun ownership should not affect the analysis either because the
Florida Legislature explicitly limited its intent favoring gun owner-
ship to those gun uses which are lawful. 1° 1 As the Maryland court
found, Saturday Night Specials-given their unique characteris-
tics-are not consistent with lawful purposes.105
Thus, Florida's gun control legislation is similar to that of Mary-
land's in evincing a policy that only certain legitimate uses of
handguns are consistent with the public interest. Hence, propo-
nents of Saturday Night Special manufacturer and marketer liabil-
ity could argue that in Florida as in Maryland any category of fire-
arm not suited for the legitimate uses outlined by the statute is not
sanctioned by the public policy of the state.
95. Id. § 790.05.
96. Compare FLA. STAT. § 790.05 (1985) with MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36B(b) (1957,
1982 Repl. Vol.).
97. FLA. STAT. § 790.06.
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36E(a) (1957, 1982 Repl. Vol.).
99. FLA. STAT. § 790.25(4).
100. Compare FLA. STAT. § 790.06 (1985) with MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36E(a) (1957,
1982 Repl. Vol. & Cum. Supp. 1985).
101. FLA. STAT. § 790.25(4). The statute directs that it be construed "in favor of the
constitutional right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes." Id. (emphasis added).
102. Kelley, 497 A.2d at 1153-54.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Kelley court did not overstep its judicial authority and
make law inconsistent with legislative policy or prerogative. In-
stead, the court decided an issue traditionally within the purview
of its role as the arbiter of the common law. It saw an injustice and
found that its goal in providing a remedy was within the estab-
lished policy of the state. If a Florida court were to make a similar
decision, it too could reconcile Saturday Night Special manufac-
turer liability with the state's policy on firearms. No matter how it
resolves this issue, however, a Florida court should do so with a
candor akin to that exhibited by the Maryland Court of Appeals. It
is only by facing the handgun problem head-on that this difficult
issue can be fully addressed and the policy choices intelligently
made.
Matthew S. Steffey

